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Micropayment schemes usually do not provide fairness, which means
that either the payer or the payee, or both, can cheat the other and gain a
financial advantage by misbehaving in the protocols. The authors
propose an extension to a family of micropayment schemes that
removes the financial incentive to cheat. The proposed extension does
not provide true fairness, but it renders misbehaving practically futile
for both the payer and the payee. This is achieved without any
substantial loss in efficiency in most practical cases. 
Introduction: Micropayment schemes [1 – 5] are electronic payment
schemes explicitly developed for very low value payment transactions,
such as payment for information on the World Wide Web and payment
for each second of a phone call. The chief design goal of micropayment
schemes is efficiency. Reaching this goal requires that communication
and processing costs of micropayments be kept as low as possible, oth-
erwise these costs may exceed the value of the payment itself and, thus,
applying the micropayment scheme would not be economical. Other
properties, such as fairness and sometimes even security (at least to
some extent) are sacrificed in favour of efficiency. Here, fairness means
that either both the payer and the payee receive the expected item in the
transaction (i.e. the service paid for and the payment, respectively) or
neither receives anything. Providing fairness is considered to be too
expensive for micropayments, because it requires either too much com-
munication and/or computation, or the assistance of a trusted third party.
Consequently, micropayment schemes are not fair; if the payer has to
move first, then the payee can cheat by not providing the service after
the payment has been received, otherwise the payer can cheat by not
sending payment for the received service. It is argued that this potential
misbehaviour of the parties is tolerable, since the potential loss is very
low. While this is true considering one single transaction, it might be a
problem considering the global system and longer time periods. To illus-
trate this, we consider a service provider, which persistently cheats by
stealing one cent in each transaction. This service provider can earn
more than one million dollars in a year given it has about 300000 trans-
actions per day. As a rough guide, a rather small telecommunication net-
work operator with 50000 subscribers processes at least 300000 phone
calls per day. The question is: can micropayment schemes be improved
with respect to fairness without too much loss in efficiency? In this Let-
ter, we answer this question affirmatively by proposing an extension to a
family of micropayment schemes that, although not providing true fair-
ness, at least removes the financial incentive to cheat. 
Original micropayment scheme: We only consider micropayment
schemes where payment is based on the successive release of elements
in a chain of cryptographic hash values (e.g. [1, 3 – 6]). In particular, we
will illustrate our ideas by extending the PayWord system [5]. Other
members of the same family can be extended in a similar way. 
There are three roles in PayWord: the user U, the vendor V and the
broker B. Each user is registered with at least one broker. This relation-
ship is represented by a PayWord certificate signed and issued by the
broker, which binds the broker’s name, the user’s name and the user’s
public key together. 
When U wants to buy some services from V, they generate a fresh
chain of paywords w1, w2, ..., wn by picking the last payword wn at ran-
dom and then computing wi = h(wi+1) for i = n–1, n–z ..., 0, where h
denotes a publicly known, cryptographically strong one-way hash func-
tion and n is chosen by U. w0 is called the root of the payword chain, and
it is not a payword itself. U then signs a commitment to this payword
chain, which contains the vendor’s name and the root of the payword
chain. This commitment is sent to V at the beginning of the service ses-
sion. It authorises B to pay V for any of the paywords w1, w2, ..., wn that
V redeems with B later. 
The ith micropayment from U to V consists of the pair (wi, i). This
can be verified by V using wi-1 which is known from the previous micro-
payment or from the commitment in case of i = 1. A typical service ses-
sion consists of a sequence of micropayments: 
U fi  V: w1, 1 
U ‹  V: first part of service 
U fi  V: w2, 2 
U ‹  V: second part of service ELECTRONICS LETTERS    20th January 2000    Vol. 36... 
U fi  V: wl, l 
U ‹  V: last part of service 
where A fi  B: msg means that A sends the message msg to B, and l £  n. 
After service provision, V contacts B and presents the commitment
and the last payment (wl, l) received. B verifies the signature on the com-
mitment and the validity of wl, and, if these verifications are successful,
pays V the amount corresponding to l paywords and charges that amount
to the billing account of U. 
As discussed before, PayWord does not provide fairness. The vendor
may cheat the user by sending an unexpected service or nothing at all. If
such misbehaviour is detected by the user, then they can stop sending
more paywords, but they still lose the last one already sent. Since a pay-
word has a very low value, this does not cause too much damage for the
user. A persistently cheating vendor, however, can earn a substantial
amount of money in this way. 
Modified micropayment scheme: We now present our extension to Pay-
Word that removes the financial incentive to cheat and, thus, makes the
misbehaviour described above practically futile. We modify the original
scheme only slightly and show that efficiency does not decrease substan-
tially in most practical cases. This modification was inspired by [7],
which describes how electronic coins can be ripped and ripped coins can
be used in payments to remove the financial incentive to cheat. Our
basic idea is to double the size of the hash chain and let a payword con-
sist of two consecutive hash values. Intuitively, these can be thought of
as two half-paywords. The first half-payword is sent to the vendor
before the service provision and the second half is sent after the service
has been provided. Thus, the vendor can redeem the full payword only if
they have provided the service. This gives an advantage to the user, who
can refuse to send the second half-payword in the hope that they can
escape from paying for the received service. To deter the user from
doing this, we let the broker charge the full value of a payword to the
user’s account if the vendor presents the first half-payword (which
leaves the broker with a surplus of the value of one payword). This
makes cheating of no interest to the user, because they have to pay, even
though the vendor cannot get this money. The surplus of the broker is
handled according to some policy (e.g. it can be distributed to charity).
This policy is verified and its observance controlled by independent law
enforcement organisations, thus rendering collusion between the user
and the broker as well as between the vendor and the broker very diffi-
cult. 
We modify only the micropayment protocol and the way in which the
paywords are redeemed by the vendor and the user is charged by the
broker. When U wants to buy some services from V, they generate a
fresh chain of hash values w ¢0 , w1, w ¢1 , w2, w ¢2  ..., wn w ¢n  by picking w ¢n
at random and then computing wi = h(w ¢i ) and w ¢i–1  = h(wi) for i = n, n–1,
..., 1. The root of the chain is now w ¢0  and U puts this value in the com-
mitment, which they construct in the same way as in the original scheme
and send to V at the beginning of the service session. 
The ith micropayment has three steps. First U sends the pair (wi, 2i–1)
to V (the first half-payword), then V provides the ith piece of the service
to U, and finally U sends the pair (w ¢i , 2i) to V (the second half-pay-
word). Each half-payword can be checked by V using the previously
received half-payword. It might seem that our scheme requires twice as
many messages from U to V as the original one, but fortunately this is
not true in most practical cases. Typically, a service session consists of a
series of consecutive micropayments, and U can send the second half-
payword of the ith payment (w ¢i , 2i) and the first half-payword of the
(i+1)st payment (wi+1, 2i+1) in one single message. Furthermore, since V
can always compute w ¢i  from wi+1, only the second pair (wi+1, 2i+1) has
to be sent. A typical service session may thus have the following appear-
ance:  
U fi  V: w1, 1  
U ‹  V: first part of service  
U fi  V: w2, 3  
U ‹  V: second part of service  
...  
U fi  V: wl, 2l–1  
U ‹  V: last part of service  
U fi  V: w ¢l , 2l 
which involves only one additional message compared to the original
scheme. 
If everything goes well, then V can present the commitment and the
pair (w ¢l , 2l) to B, which performs the same verifications (with twice as    No. 2
many hash computations) as in the original scheme. If the verifications
are successful, then B pays V the amount corresponding to l paywords
and charges the same amount to the account of U. If something goes
wrong and the last half-payword is missing, then V can only present the
commitment and the pair (wl, 2l–1) to B. After the verifications, B pays
V the amount corresponding to l–1 paywords and charges U for the
amount corresponding to l paywords. 
Analysis: Our scheme does not provide fairness, since theoretically it is
still possible that one of the parties could cheat the other. The vendor
can refuse to provide the last part of the service after receiving the first
half of the last payword. In this case, the user receives services that are
worth l–1 paywords, but they will be charged for l paywords. Similarly,
the user can refuse to send the second half of the last payword after
receiving the last part of the service. In this case, the vendor provides
services that are worth l paywords but can redeem only l–1 paywords. 
However, none of the parties gain any financial advantages by cheat-
ing. In the original scheme, it is possible that the vendor provides serv-
ices that are worth l–1 paywords and redeems l paywords. In our
scheme, the vendor can never earn more than the value of the services
they provide, since the user authorises the payment after they have
received the services (by sending the second half-payword). Similarly,
the user can never receive services that are worth more than that they are
charged for, because they are charged before receiving the service (when
releasing the first half-payword). 
In terms of efficiency, our scheme is not substantially less efficient
than the original one, in most practical cases. First of all, the number of
public key cryptographic operations (digital signature generation and
verification) is the same as in the original scheme. Although each
sequence of consecutive micropayments in our scheme requires one
additional message from the user to the vendor, this is negligible consid-
ering that such a sequence usually consists of hundreds of messages. We
require the hash chain to be twice as long as in the original scheme. This
requires twice as many hash computations by the user (when the pay-
words are generated), the vendor (when the paywords are verified) and
the broker (when the paywords are redeemed). The user and the broker
cases are not real efficiency problems, because these computations are
off-line. The size of the memory where the user stores the chain does not
need to be doubled. It is more efficient to store only the first half-pay-
words (i.e. w1, w2, ..., wn) and w¢ n  additionally, because the second half-
paywords are usually not used in a sequence of consecutive micropay-ELECTRONICS LETTERS    20th January 2000    Vol. 36 ments. If a second half-payword is needed, then it can be easily com-
puted by one application of the hash function on one of the stored
values. The required memory sizes for the vendor and the broker are the
same as in the original scheme. Thus, the only factor that makes our
scheme less efficient than the original one is that verification of the
micropayments requires twice as many on-line hash computations by
the vendor (i.e. two hash computations per micropayment). This is the
price that has to be paid for the additional guarantees that our scheme
provides. 
Acknowledgments: The author wishes to thank U. Wilhelm, M. Hamdi,
J.-P. Hubaux, S. Staamann and B. Frajka for useful comments and help-
ful discussions. 
© IEE 2000 20th October 1999
Electronics Letters Online No: 20000163
DOI: 10.1049/el:20000163
L. Buttyán (Institute for Computer Communications and Applications, Swiss
Federal Institute of Technology, CH-1015 Lausanne, Switzerland)
E-mail: Levente.Buttyan@epfl.ch
References 
1 ANDERSON, R., MANIFAVAS, C., and SUTHERLAND, C.: ‘NetCard - A practical
electronic cash system’. Technical report, Cambridge University,
Computer Laboratory, 1995
2 GLASSMAN, S., MANASSE, M., ABADI, M., GAUTHIER, P., and SOBALVARRO, P.:
‘The Millicent protocol for inexpensive electronic commerce’, in O’REILY
and Associates, Inc. (Eds.): Proc. 4th Int. World Wide Web Conf.,
December 1995, pp. 603–618 
3 HAUSER, R., STEINER, M., and WAIDNER, M.: ‘Micro-payments based on iKP’.
Technical report RZ 2791, IBM Research, February 1996
4 PEDERSEN, T.: ‘Electronic payment of small amounts’. Technical report
DAIMI-PB-495, Aarhus University, Computer Science Department,
1995
5 RIVEST, R., and SHAMIR, A.: ‘PayWord and MicroMint: Two simple micro-
payment schemes’. Technical report, MIT Laboratory for Computer
Science, 1996
6 MARTIN, K., PRENEEL, B., MITCHELL, C., HITZ, H., HORN, G., POLIAKOVA, A.,
and HOWARD, P.: ‘Secure billing for mobile information services in
UMTS’. Proc. IS&N’98, 1998, 
7 JAKOBSSON, M.: ‘Ripping coins for a fair exchange’. Proc.
EUROCRYPT’95, 1995, pp. 220–230    No. 2
